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Are those who subscribe to the view that early embryos are persons irrational 
and inconsistent? A reply to Brock 
 
Abstract. Dan Brock has asserted that those who claim that the early embryo has full 
moral status are not consistent, and that the rationality of such a position is dubious 
when it is adopted from a religious perspective. I argue that both claims are flawed. 
Starting with the latter claim, I argue that Brock has provided no argument why the 
religious position should be less rational than the secular position, and that this claim 
is grounded in Brock’s absolutist position, which I reject. With regard to the former 
claim, I argue that those who hold the view that the early embryo has full moral status 
can be consistent even if they do not oppose sexual reproduction, even if they do not 
grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other humans, even if they 
prefer to save one child instead of 100 embryos in the event of fire, and even if they 
do not accept racism and sexism. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent paper Dan Brock identifies two obstacles to human embryonic stem cell 
research, neither of which he believes ‘survives critical scrutiny’: firstly, that such 
research depends on the unjustifiable destruction of embryos; and secondly, that 
cloning by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques is immoral.[1] In this 
paper, I address two claims made by Brock to undermine the first obstacle: that those 
who hold the view that the early embryo has full moral or full personhood status 
(henceforth: the F view) are not only inconsistent, but also, when they adopt such a 
position from a non-secular perspective, ‘largely impervious to … rational 
argument’.[2] 
The latter claim will be addressed first. Brock contrasts his own ‘secular’ 
position with the position of those for whom ‘the belief that human embryos are full 
human persons is a religious dogma’. Brock expects that only those who hold ‘this 
belief in its secular forms’ can be persuaded by ‘the arguments’ he presents to 
‘challenge’ the ‘belief’ that human embryos are full persons. This is so because Brock 
asserts that the religious position ‘does not rest on, and so is largely impervious to, 
rational argument’.[3] 
 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RATIONALITY 
 
 In order to evaluate this claim, we must distinguish between internal and 
external rationality. With internal rationality I mean consistency. For example, if 
someone claims that adult human life is precious, but regularly engages in killing 
adults for trivial reasons, then we can say that such a person is not consistent with 
their proclaimed value that adult human life is precious. The inconsistency could 
either result from a failure to live in accordance with one’s values, or from a 
misunderstanding of what one’s values are. With internal rationality, what counts as 
rational and irrational can be decided impartially. Provided that those who engage in a 
debate accept the importance of consistency, all parties should, in principle, be as 
open towards the possibility of finding inconsistencies in their own views as in the 
views of others. For example, someone who accepts the rules of mathematics and 
denies that two and two make four should be open to the charge of irrationality. 
External rationality is the domain of value theory. Natural law theory, for 
example, is a value theory which holds that there are basic human goods, and that the 
most important objective of ethical theory is to establish what these goods are. The 
crucial question here is not whether a particular decision or action is consistent with 
one’s values, but whether particular values (for example consistency, or respect for 
human life) represent basic human goods. A decision or action may then be logically 
or internally consistent with one’s values, but not be good when evaluated in the light 
of such a theory of the human good. For example, I could claim that someone who 
regularly kills adult humans for trivial reasons because he or she does not believe that 
human life is precious is consistent or internally rational, but lacks an adequate 
appreciation of what I may consider to be a fundamental human value: the 
preservation of human life. I could then claim that someone who does not value the 
preservation of adult human life to the same extent as I do is irrational. However, the 
same claim could be made by the person who does not have an interest in the 
preservation of adult human life. He or she could argue, in reverse, that I have an 
inadequate appreciation of fundamental human goods, for example an interest in 
killing adult humans, and that I am therefore irrational. The question must be asked, 
though, if it is still appropriate to use the words ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ here, 
precisely because a common framework on which to judge what counts as rational 
and irrational is lacking. Since appeals to rationality are most commonly understood 
in terms of appeals to internal consistency (where the assumption is that all partners in 
the debate consider consistency to be a virtue), the question must be asked if it is 
appropriate to say that a particular view either is or is not rational when that view is 
evaluated as more or less rational in relation to one’s own view of some human good 
other than the shared good of consistency. In response to this, three answers might be 
given. One reply is adopted by those who support moral absolutism. This is the 
doctrine that, when two are more parties involved in a moral debate experience a 
value conflict, it is appropriate to decide which of the parties has the rational, or more 
rational perspective. A different response is adopted by those who support moral 
relativism. This is the doctrine that no party can be either more or less rational than 
any other party (as the belief that there are values which all people should adopt is 
rejected). Both responses are dogmatic, since they make universal claims. The former 
doctrine asserts that it is always possible to access a common framework against 
which it becomes clear whose values are the more rational. The latter doctrine does 
not tolerate the possibility that there might be such a framework. A third, non-
dogmatic response is Pyrrhonian moral scepticism, the position which I favour.[4] 
Pyrrhonian moral scepticism maintains the absolutist’s conviction that one party may 
well be more rational than another, but refuses to make the claim that those with 
different values are irrational. When two incommensurable value systems conflict, the 
response of the Pyrrhonian sceptic is neither to claim that one is more rational than 
the other (as the moral absolutist would do) nor to claim that both are equally rational 
(as the moral relativist would do), but to suspend judgment about which system might 
be more rational. Parties with incommensurable value systems cannot make impartial 
decisions – that is, decisions that should be accepted by both parties - about what 
counts as rational, since their definitions of what counts as rational are mutually 
exclusive. This need not exclude the possibility that the parties might come to a 
shared value system after discussion. As a Pyrrhonian sceptic, I try to appreciate the 
fact that I do not know what it means to be someone else, and therefore that I cannot 
claim that what I perceive as the human good should also be perceived as the human 
good by someone else. This need not result in the abandonment of the view that there 
are fundamental human goods. I may hold on to the view that there are goods that 
should be valued by everyone, but should recognise at the same time that I am not in a 
position to claim that someone with different ideas about what these goods are, is 
irrational. While I do not endorse a subjectivist moral theory where there are no 
fundamental human goods (but only individual goods), neither do I claim to know that 
those who have a different view from my own about what these goods are, are 
irrational period. This distinction between internal and external rationality will be 
relevant to evaluate Brock’s claim that only those who ascribe to the F view from a 
religious position are ‘largely impervious to … rational argument’.[4]  
 
ARE THOSE WHO ASCRIBE TO THE F VIEW FROM A RELIGIOUS 
PERSPECTIVE IRRATIONAL? 
 
A first problem with this assertion is why this should only be the case for those who 
make this claim from a religious perspective. The claim that God decides that early 
embryos have full moral status (and tells me so) is neither more nor less rational than 
the claim that I decide that early embryos have such status. Surely, for those who find 
such a view problematic, the question of which person states such a view, whether it 
is God or someone else, should not matter. If their concern is with the moral claim of 
such a position (the claim that embryos have full moral status), their concern should 
stand (irrespective of the question of which person might make such a claim). If their 
concern is with belief in God, nothing is yet decided about the validity of their moral 
claim. They might simply disagree with those who claim that God exists, and 
therefore conclude that those who claim to argue from ‘religious dogma’ in fact 
simply argue from their own, personal dogma. Yet, in that case, while those who 
argue from a religious perspective might be held to be confused or mistaken about the 
source of their moral views, nothing has yet been decided about the validity of their 
views. Therefore, Brock has failed to establish why only those who ascribe to such a 
position from a religious perspective, not those who cherish ‘this belief in its secular 
forms’, would be ‘largely impervious to … rational argument’.[5] 
Secondly, Brock’s use of the words ‘rational argument’ suggests that what he 
criticises is the internal rationality of those who subscribe to this view. This is so 
because the domain of external rationality is not the domain of arguments, but the 
domain of values which are simply assumed to be either rational or irrational by those 
who subscribe to them. The problem, however, is that Brock provides no argument 
against the internal consistency of those who hold the F view from a religious 
perspective. To substantiate his claim, Brock could have provided a justification for 
why he might believe that only religious people are prone to particular 
inconsistencies. Yet no such argument is provided. Indeed, all his arguments related 
to the internal consistency of the F view are addressed against those who subscribe to 
this view ‘in its secular forms’.[6] This excludes, therefore, the possibility of Brock 
thinking that only those who hold the F view from a religious perspective would be 
inconsistent. In the second part of this paper, I shall argue, however, that Brock’s 
charges of inconsistency are flawed.       
Thirdly, if the position of those who subscribe to the F view from a religious 
perspective cannot be distinguished from secular perspectives on the basis of the 
criterion of internal irrationality, the distinguishing feature must be sought in the 
external rationality of such a position. Presumably, this is because Brock thinks that 
those who support the F view because they think that mere species membership is 
sufficient for personhood are less ‘impervious’ to reason than those who support the 
same view because God has told them that mere species membership is sufficient. 
Yet, as mentioned before, to assess the normative claim of such a view, the question 
of which person states such a view should be irrelevant. Therefore, Brock has failed to 
establish why only those who subscribe to the F view from a religious perspective 
would be ‘largely impervious to’ reason. Incidentally, if ‘being dogmatic’ in the 
negative sense of the word ‘dogmatic’ includes judging someone’s views on the basis 
of one’s like or dislike of the person stating those views or of the group which that 
person is thought to belong to, then it is Brock, rather than those who subscribe to the 
F view from ‘religious dogma’, who is being dogmatic. This must be concluded since 
Brock does not claim that the F view per se is ‘largely impervious to … rational 
argument’, but that it only is when adopted by those with non-secular premises.[7] If 
we now assess the external rationality of the F view in general, it must be concluded 
that Brock’s critique is valid, yet only for those who share Brock’s premise that it is 
the possession of certain properties that are not possessed by early embryos which 
matters morally, rather than either their own or God’s premise. Yet, rather than claim 
that the F view is ‘largely impervious to … rational argument’, a Pyrrhonian sceptic 
might make the more humble claim that such a view is ‘largely impervious to’ his or 
her perspective of what is rational.[8] Brock, however, is convinced that only those 
who share his premise, or can be ‘convince(d)’ by it, have the right theory of human 
goods.[9] While this might be true, it is not clear why Brock’s view would, in contrast 
to the religious view, ‘rest on … rational argument’.[10] Brock acknowledges that he 
is not sure about what property grounds personhood status, but that ‘whatever the 
property(s) is … embryos at the blastocyst stage … lack any of the properties that 
have been, or might plausibly be, claimed to confer personhood’.[11] There is a clear 
bias, rather than a ‘rational argument’, underlying this statement: whatever property it 
is we decide on, it must not be one that applies to the early embryo. Even if Brock had 
committed himself to a property, for example sentience, his account would be biased, 
since he provides no reason why those who agree with his position should be more 
rational. Instead, he holds the moral absolutist position which asserts dogmatically 
that those who side with him on the embryo’s status are more rational. Brock simply 
claims that rational people’s intuitions about personhood exclude the possibility of 
including early embryos. Rather than agree with the Pyrrhonian sceptic’s view that no 
party possesses a privileged vantage point wherefrom value conflicts can be resolved, 
and therefore that no party can claim to be more rational, Brock hopes that those who 
accept the F view ‘in its secular forms’ will come to see that grounding personhood 
status on the possession of ‘some properties’ that early embryos lack, rather than 
species membership, is more rational.[12] Brock might be right that some may shift to 
his perspective, but the claim that his case would, in contrast to those who argue from 
‘religious dogma’, ‘rest on … rational argument’, is problematic.[13] Brock fails to 
explain why only someone like himself, but not someone who subscribes to the F 
view from religious premises, could judge whose values are the more rational.[14] 
Fourthly, Brock holds that only those who hold the F view ‘in its secular 
forms’ can be changed by his arguments and that the belief of those who hold this 
view ‘as a matter of religious dogma … is not subject to change by’ his 
‘arguments’.[15] Since Brock’s arguments, however, depend on the validity of the 
premise that the possession of certain properties should decide about personhood 
status - a premise which is taken for granted, rather than ‘establish(ed)’ by rational 
argument - there is no reason why only those who start from ‘secular’ premises might 
be inspired by Brock’s account to reconsider their premises.[16] If the word ‘dogma’ 
is understood in terms of one’s ‘fundamental beliefs’, Brock has failed to establish 
why only those with religious fundamental beliefs should be held to be incapable of 
change. However, if Brock’s reference to ‘dogma’ must be interpreted in terms of a 
concern with ‘being dogmatic’ or ‘dogmatic attitudes’, I share Brock’s concern. The 
word ‘dogma’ is then understood in terms of a belief that one’s own premises are the 
(only) basis for discussion and that, therefore, the key to resolving value conflicts is to 
encourage others to accept the validity of one’s own value premises. Yet, on this 
interpretation, Brock provides no argument why only religious people would fall prey 
to such an attitude. Indeed, his own position exemplifies it, precisely because it is 
contrasted to a position that ‘does not rest on … rational argument’.[17] Even those 
who adopt the F view from a secular perspective do not escape from this critique, as 
Brock does not claim that he disagrees with the basis from which they develop their 
views, but that they do not provide ‘any basis’.[18] This is wrong, as the basis they 
provide is mere ‘species membership’, rather than Brock’s basis (the possession of 
‘some properties’ not possessed by early embryos).[19] If there is no impartial arbiter 
to judge whose values are the more rational, Brock claims unjustifiably that only the 
values of a particular collection of people with different values do ‘not rest on … 
rational argument’.[20] If neither the F view nor Brock’s view has privileged access 
to reason, should we then conclude that proponents of both views are incapable of 
change? I do not think that such a defeatist attitude, which could mask an 
unwillingness to engage in debate with others, should be the inevitable outcome. 
While ultimate values have a certain robustness precisely because they precede 
rational discourse, critical examination of one’s values and value discussion with 
others are necessary in order to reveal whether one’s proclaimed values really are 
one’s values, to foster mutual understanding by sharing with others where one is 
coming from, and to promote openness to others, which includes accepting the 
possibility of change.  
Three things must be concluded: firstly, that Brock has failed to argue that 
only those who subscribe to the F view from a non-secular perspective would be 
‘largely impervious to … rational argument’; secondly, that the claim that Brock is 
‘largely impervious’ to someone else’s understanding of what is rational could 
justifiably be made by someone who does not share Brock’s value assumptions; and 
thirdly, that – provided that those who argue from religious dogma do not share 
Brock’s dogmatic attitude – there is no reason to think why their views might not be 
subject to change.[21]       
 
IS THE F VIEW INCONSISTENT? 
 
As mentioned before, Brock provides a number of arguments which purport to show 
that the position of those who hold the F view is inconsistent. To these arguments I 
shall now turn. 
Firstly, he argues that those who hold the F view ‘should reject the practice of 
sexual reproduction’ because ‘from each embryo that is born alive from normal sexual 
reproduction … three are created who will die before birth’ or ‘three are sacrificed for 
each that is born’.[22] Brock contends that normal reproduction is morally equivalent 
with sacrificing embryos for research as both involve embryo loss. The suggestion is 
that it is inconsistent to object to the latter, yet not to the former. The snake here is the 
word ‘sacrificed’. Brock is wrong to hold that embryos are ‘sacrificed’ in normal 
reproduction, at least to suggest that this is no different from their being ‘sacrificed’ 
for research. In normal reproduction, some embryos die without deliberately being 
killed. In embryo research, embryos are deliberately killed. Brock might counter that 
one is still responsible for the death of the life that one has created, as death can only 
occur once life has been created. This objection, however, fails. The act of giving life 
is not an act of killing, even if death will inevitably follow. The difference is morally 
relevant. For example, the perceived difference explains why it is not inconsistent to 
oppose the killing of one’s children (in normal circumstances), in spite of the fact that 
they die naturally and would not have died had they not existed. If there is no 
inconsistency in accepting that one’s children die and not accepting their killing (in 
normal circumstances), Brock has failed to argue that those who hold the F view must 
oppose normal reproduction.[23]        
Secondly, Brock holds that those who hold the F view are inconsistent, unless 
they grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other human lives, 
because ‘the loss of embryos … is rarely grieved over in the way the death of a 
person, or even a fetus, is grieved over’.[24] Brock’s use of the word ‘rarely’ is 
significant as it leaves the door open for the possibility that some may grieve in the 
same way, who would therefore not be deemed to be inconsistent on this basis. Yet 
the question must be asked if being less concerned about the death of embryos really 
is inconsistent with the F view. Brock’s view seems to simplify a complex matter. 
Surely, the reason why people grieve either more or less over the death of one person 
compared to the death of another cannot just be based on an assessment of their 
relative moral status. Generally, I am much more affected by the death of one of my 
relatives or friends than by the deaths of people whom I hardly know. However, when 
someone I do not know well dies young, I may be affected more than by the death, at 
a ripe old age, of one of my relatives or friends. An anonymous referee pointed out 
that, to strengthen my case, I should have compared the way in which we are affected 
by embryonic death with the way in which we are affected by the death of a young 
child. What may be suggested is the view that, since there is a contrast between the 
relatively smaller amount of mourning over embryonic death and the relatively 
greater amount of mourning over the death of a young child, there must be a 
difference in moral status. I do not think the alleged discrepancy weakens my case. 
My argument is not that the view that there is a difference in moral status between 
embryos and children is wrong. Rather, it is that the claim that there is such a 
difference in status does not necessarily follow from a difference in the degree of  
grief their deaths might cause. I have no reason to believe that Brock thinks some 
adults have less worth than others either explains why, or follows from the perception 
that their deaths might not be grieved over to the same extent. In that case, it is not 
clear why we should conclude that embryos lack full moral status if their deaths are 
not mourned over much. Not grieving to the same extent over the deaths of embryos 
is not necessarily inconsistent with the F view. 
Thirdly, Brock refers to a scenario (the embryo rescue case) attributed to 
Michael Sandel: ‘if there was a fire in the fertility lab and one could save a tray of 100 
surplus embryos or one eight year old child, but not both, virtually everyone would 
save the child’.[25] Brock argues that, if the scenario involved 100 children instead of 
100 embryos, ‘virtually everyone’ would save the 100 children rather than the other 
child, and that therefore those who hold the F view, yet prefer the eight year old child 
over the tray of embryos, are inconsistent. I believe this must not necessarily be the 
case. One could argue that the fate of the surplus embryos has already been sealed, 
and that therefore what justifies saving the eight year old is that the child will be 
allowed to develop, whereas the embryos will not be allowed to develop for much 
longer. Therefore, saving the embryos would be futile. To rule out this possibility, the 
question must be asked if the outcome should be different when saving the embryos 
were not futile. Let us imagine, therefore, that all the embryos are about to be 
implanted. The argument could be made that we should still save the child because we 
can identify more easily with how the child will be affected by the fire, and can 
reasonably assume that it will be affected more severely by it than the embryos, at 
least provided we are justified in assuming that it has more developed capacities to 
experience pain. Should we therefore conclude that the status of those people with 
more developed capacities to feel pain is greater than the status of those with lesser 
capacities? For example, if we compare two adults, one capable of feeling pain, the 
other unconscious, should we conclude that the former has more moral worth than the 
latter? Not necessarily. Yet, while both may have the same moral status, this need not 
require that their treatment should be the same. In the event of fire, a preference for 
the one capable of feeling pain may be justified merely on the grounds that, all else 
being equal, we have a duty to prevent suffering wherever we can. Yet what if we 
change the scenario to one where a choice must be made between one adult capable of 
feeling pain and 100 adults who (for one reason or another) are unconscious. One’s 
moral intuition may point to a preference for the latter. If one’s moral intuition is to 
save the former when the 100 adults are substituted by 100 embryos, must it then not 
be concluded that, even when it is granted that the capacity to feel pain does not affect 
one’s moral status, the F view is inconsistent? Not necessarily. The argument could be 
made that there are additional factors that need to be taken into consideration to 
determine who should be saved. In the context of discussing the embryo rescue case, 
Matthew Liao, for example, has argued for the relevance of ‘time-relative interests’, a 
concept introduced by Jeff McMahan, which refers to one’s relative capacity to have 
psychological relations to one’s past and future selves: ‘For example, an infant will 
typically have weaker time-relative interests in, for example, continuing to live than a 
grown adult, since an infant has little or no awareness of his or her future life. Or, 
someone in the middle stage of an Alzheimer’s disease will have weaker time-relative 
interests than a normal adult’.[26] Liao argues that a difference in time-relative 
interests does not imply a difference in moral status (as such interests can be 
overriden by agent-relative reasons, as discussed below), but that it does provide for 
an additional reason why the person with the stronger time-relative interests should be 
saved. While this account has its merits, a further factor that I believe to be morally 
relevant is the fact that most infants, unlike those suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, 
can be expected to increase their time-relative interests rapidly and for a long time. 
Would this imply that, given a choice between 100 embryos and a person with 
Alzheimer’s disease, the embryos should be saved? Not necessarily. We have already 
mentioned the relevance of a prima facie duty to prevent suffering, which may apply 
here. This points at a wider issue, being  the fact that we are affected differently by 
embryos than by children or adults. While we have all been embryos, we do not really 
know what it is like to be an embryo. We do not know what it is like to be another 
adult or child either, yet we can, and do, imagine what it might be like by 
extrapolating from our inner experiences. Because we find it easier to place ourselves 
inside the shoes of other adults or children, we are more likely to be affected more 
negatively by negative things affecting their lives, and may therefore be more inclined 
to try to prevent these negative things from happening to them. This ‘empathy-based 
reason’ may justify saving the person with Alzheimer’s. However, what Liao has 
called an ‘agent-relative reason’, and what I prefer to call a ‘relationship-based 
reason’, may be relevant as well.[27] In recent philosophical debate, the idea that it is 
appropriate to give moral weight to the fact that one has a relationship with someone 
has been defended against the common charge that we should adopt an impartialist 
ethic by John Cottingham, who speaks of ‘philophilic partiality’.[28] Cottingham’s 
account provides a justification for my perception that I have stronger duties towards 
my own children than towards my neighbour’s children or towards a stranger’s 
children because of the stronger relationships I have with my own children. Therefore, 
I have a relationship-based reason to save my children rather than someone else’s 
when a decision must be made about who to save. Should I therefore conclude that the 
moral status of my own children is greater than the moral status of any other children? 
Many readers may agree that they have equal moral status. Indeed, Cottingham has 
argued rightly that my partialism towards my own children is compatible with the 
view ‘that any parent … ought to favour his own child’.[29] In other words, the claim 
that everyone has the same moral rights need not imply that everyone has the same 
duties to respect those rights. On this basis, Liao has argued that a preference for the 
tray of embryos may be justifiable (yet not a preference for one’s beloved Picasso 
painting, because the painting does not have moral status), if one or more of those 
embryos are one’s own.[30] While this must not necessarily be concluded because of 
the need to take into consideration the additional factors I mentioned, I have shown 
that the F view is not necessarily inconsistent if a decision is made to save one eight 
year old child over a tray of 100 embryos.     
Fourthly, Brock suggests that those who base personhood status on mere 
‘species membership’ must also accept racism and sexism, or at least acknowledge 
that their position ‘would be akin to racists’ or sexists’ claims of special moral status 
or superiority for their own race or sex’.[31] This critique is a familiar one, and has 
enjoyed a great deal of support since the publication of Singer’s ‘Animal 
Liberation’.[32] A first problem with Brock’s contention is that it is not inconsistent 
to ascribe equal status to all humans, and to hold at the same time that humans are not 
superior to nonhumans. The claim that the status possessed by humans is superior to 
the status possessed by nonhumans is different from the claim that humans are 
superior to nonhumans. I might well hold that humans are in no way superior to 
nonhumans, but that humans have stronger obligations towards humans than towards 
nonhumans, and that this is why humans have a superior moral status. Likewise, 
racists’ or sexists’ claims that their members of their race or sex have greater moral 
status must not necessarily be accompanied by claims of superiority. A second 
problem is that the analogy is flawed. If the analogy were valid, the same analogy 
could be made with regard to Brock’s position: The claim that possession of ‘some 
properties’ confers moral status ‘would be akin to’ racism or sexism.[33] The analogy 
is invalid, since speciesists claim that ‘mere species membership’ matters, rather than 
race or sex. A third problem is Brock’s contention that speciesists do not offer ‘any 
basis’ for their position.[34] In fact, they do. They claim that the basis is ‘mere 
species membership’, rather than ‘some properties’ not possessed by early embryos, 
the basis provided by Brock. 
Finally, Brock argues that ‘moral arguments fail to … establish that human 
embryos are full human persons who should never be deliberately destroyed’.[35] 
This confounds two issues. Having moral status need not necessarily imply that it is 
always wrong to deliberately destroy what has moral status. In a different paper I have 
argued, in fact, that a revised interpretation of the argument from Thomson’s famous 
violinist can justify why the destruction of embryos is not always wrong, even if the 
assumption is made that they are full human persons.[36] If the argument developed 
there is sound, those who subscribe to the F view are not necessarily inconsistent by 
allowing deliberate destruction in some situations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the first part of this paper I argued that Brock has failed to establish that only the 
position of those who claim that the early embryo is a full person from a non-secular 
perspective is ‘largely impervious to … rational argument’.[37] I also argued that 
Brock’s critique does not stem from a critical consideration of the normative content 
of such a position, but from dogmatic opposition to a collection of people who base 
their moral views on religious dogma. Contrary to Brock’s assertion that the views of 
those who defend the F view from a religious perspective cannot be changed, I argued 
that there is no need for such a defeatist attitude, provided that those who adopt such a 
perspective do not share Brock’s dogmatic attitude. In the second part of this paper I 
scrutinised Brock’s contention that the views of those who hold the F view in its 
secular form are inconsistent. Against Brock, I showed that those who hold the F view 
can be consistent even if they do not oppose sexual reproduction, even if they do not 
grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other humans, even if they 
prefer to save one child instead of 100 embryos in the event of fire, and even if they 
do not accept racism and sexism. 
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